Sunday, March 11, 2007
For the Record...
Christians believe in an absolute good. We know what is good, not because we read it in some text alone, rather it is because it is written on our hearts. We believe God didn't reveal "what is good" as much as He revealed Himself - the exemplification and personification of goodness. Now, the atheist, however, cannot from a naturalistic perspective affirm an absolute moral law. If so, I have provided the following questions to find out how they can. Please, enlighten me.
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26 comments:
An Atheist doesn't need to assert any sort of position on moral facts (moral realism, etc.) He or she is merely showing that the Christian God, by the Christians own standards, is immoral - whilst the Atheist might not assert that god being evil is factual, the Christian must do. You do not need to advance an ethical position to show someone elses ethical position to be self contradictory.
You're right. The atheist has an evolving ethic - one that has no foundation. If you want to talk about contradiction - how is it that we can say that what Hitler did is morally wrong - yet say there is no need to "assert moral realism?" Isn't that a contradiction? Also, is Hitler's action something only Christians oppose? I would hope not. If you do, why do you?
"You don't need to advance an ethical position to show someone else's position to be self-contradictory."
However, don't you think you need to advance your ethical position when asserting that someone's else's is WRONG? Say, Hitler?
I would say that atheists have an intuitive moral sense - ethical non-naturalism, that goodness forms an irreducible part of our sense experience, like yellow.
Any ontological link of moral goodness to God makes the concept of good vacuous:
X is what god commands, but is it good?
The point isn't ' is this correct?' but rather, is it blatantly obvious (like X has 4 equal sides, is it a square?) It certainly isn't analytically obvious, or reasoned. Whilst you can get around it by claiming it uses latter empirical verification (This is H-two-O, but is it water? isn't analytically obvious, but is empirically true.) Morality ontologically linked to the divine obviously isn't, so it doesn't work. There are also older arguments (like Hume's is-ought gap) which state that just because something is divinely commanded cannot by nature of that fact make it good.
Far more importantly, any ontological link between God and morality renders moral language meaningless, or at best redundant. If 'all good is' is God's commands (again, it works just as well for 'our purpose ordained by god, etc.) We needn't use terms like 'good' whatsoever. Just say X is what God commands - if the theory is right, there should be no need to qualify it as good, in the same way as squares and four equal sides. And, ultimately, to paraphrase Leibniz, "Why praise God for what he did, if he would be equally praiseworthy for doing exactly the contrary?" In other words, if God says to kill your family, that is now good.
Ahh, the Euthyphro Dilemma, by Plato=)
This was actually going to be my next post in order to show that God must be good. However, I will hold on that for the moment. On to your comment!=)
As I mentioned, Christians are not Divine Command Theorists. We do not think that something is good because God says it is. We believe that things are good in and of itself. In other words, we ought to be kind because there is objective value to being kind, not because God was in the mood to call it "good." This is where we differ. Since God is the exemplification and personification of goodness, He has revealed Himself to our hearts - and that is why we know what is good.
Question, so someone isn't immoral if they kill - they just lack intuition or "sense experience?" Also, if we are the products of an explosion, why is someone "wrong" for fighting "intution?" - After all, there is no absolute standard moral rule of how we "ought" to act, right?
By the way,
Your H20 example was perfect.
Most people talk about water not knowing they are talking about H20. H20 tells us something about the nature of water - that water indeed is H20. What is "good" tells us about the nature of God - that God indeed is good.
You are playing games with language in the hope of hoodwinking me, and I'm afraid I'm going to dissappoint you. It isn't the Euthyphro dilemma by the way, philosophy of religion has moved on a tad since Plato.
Firstly, some Christians are divine command theorists. You and yours evidently claim they are not. It doesn't matter, because, as I mentioned previously, all that matters is that the link between value and God is ontological. You are saying it isn't (or at least I think so, you are being a tad vague on this point) if so, then you are in exactly the same position as an Atheist in arguing the ontology of moral facts - there aren't two ways about it. Moral facts are either dependent of God (in which case you are in the same quandary as I have outlined) or they are independent, which puts you in no better position than an Atheist.
Of course, what you are alluding to is your epistemic superiority regarding moral facts - you know about them, whilst we cannot. Besides moral anti-realists simply claiming moral facts don't exist (and thus there is nothing for you to know better than us) the argument isn't congruous with experience of the two groups, which are broadly similar in behavior. Furthermore, the difference in the position between "there are moral facts ontologically tied to God" and "there are moral facts by which only knowledge of comes through God" are identical by virtue of it being impossible to practically differentiate between them.
Your question doesn't make sense, and shows your lack of understanding about (semi) contemporary meta-ethics. Someone is immoral if they kill, it is merely that they could have thought they were doing the right thing (Kant, and even earlier, Aquinas had that idea) "That which the theologian considers sinful, the moral philosopher considers contrary to reason" (paraphrasing Aquinas.) The same question can be merely rebounded back at you - as most moral philosophers assert ought implies can, atheists can't be held to be doing wrong if they are unable to know the moral facts they are contravening. I never even mentioned anything to do with our origins. But you do not understand what Moore is saying. He argues that we can render down our experiences to fundamental, irreducible ideas (sui generis, if I recall the latin correctly) like colors, tastes, et cetera. In the same manner, he asserts the same is true of good, and thus we intuitively know things which have goodness, and so on. You aren't fighting intuition, you have knowledge of right and wrong like you have knowledge of color, and it is our absolute standard for right and wrong which we all have. I don't agree with either approach, but both are as (or more) defensible than your position.
By the way,
You took my H2O example out of context and misunderstood it. Your example, properly understood is the reverse argument of your current position - instead of knowledge of God giving you knowledge of moral facts, moral facts give you knowledge of God - which isn't your original argument. It also fails courtesy of the problem that one can deny moral facts in the first place, requiring a non theistic justification before God can be asserted. In other words, you are sharing the epistemic boat with the Atheist, as I said before.
Hey Bigtex,
Actually it originates from the Euthyphro Dilemma. As you know, Socrates asked Euthyphro whether or not we do what is good because the gods say so, or do the gods say things are good because they are intrinsically good – which would imply that goodness is outside the gods. Therefore, I don’t think I made a mistake in suggesting that your statement about the Divine Command Theory resonates with ideas of the Euthyphro Dilemma.
I can’t speak for all Christians, as I’m sure you won’t speak for all agnostics. However, I can assert that I don’t align myself with the Divine Command Theory. I apologize if it somehow appeared that I was dodging your comment. I do believe that God is ontologically good. But this is not to mean that He has an objective moral law imposed upon Him – for that would imply that goodness stands outside of God, enabling Him to also be evil, and would only beg the question, “Who is imposing a moral law on God?” That is why I suggest that “God is good.” Although you may be tempted to call that a vacuous claim, please consider what I suggested earlier regarding H2O. I appropriated your discussion of H2O to illustrate that goodness is the very essence of God. Consider again:
God is good in the same way that Water is H2O. I can talk about good things without knowing that I am talking about the very make-up, nature, or characteristics of God. If I tell someone that he/she is kind, I’m not saying that they are God. However, kindness let’s me know something about the nature of God. Similarly, although Hydrogen and Oxygen can be discussed separately, I must understand that Hydrogen and Oxygen lets me know something about the quality and nature of Water. Although hydrogen and oxygen, just as kindness and love, can be discussed in different conversations, we are essentially talking about the make-up of something else. Therefore, saying that “God is good” is no more vacuous than saying “Water is H2O.” Just as Hydrogen and Oxygen lets me know something about the nature of water, Kindness and Love gives me insight on the very nature of God. This is where I must make a clarification – I have insight on the nature of God because He has revealed Himself, the exemplification and personification of goodness, upon our hearts.
Regarding “thinking you were doing the right thing” and not being held morally accountable –
I think you may be confusing personal/moral accountability with moral reprehensibility
When someone says “they didn’t know they were doing what was wrong,” they aren’t personally accountable, yet their act is still morally reprehensible. I don’t know why you have decided to bring up the topic of “Invincible Ignorance.” I don’t disagree with you in that babies aren’t personally accountable for selfishness, yet “selfishness” in and of itself is morally reprehensible. Their knowledge has nothing to do with whether or not the motive in and of itself has intrinsic quality – for, as Christians assert, there are objective values. Consider:
If a person with a mental illness chooses to impose his will upon a woman by raping her, he may not be personally accountable, although his act is still morally reprehensible or heinous. Christians can still make an assessment on an act because of its objective worth. I don’t see how atheists can do this. Allow me to explain:
If you reduce your moral values to some biological intuition, how is someone wrong on a moral level to fight that biological instinct/intuition? Aren’t you presupposing that there it is objectively valuable to follow that instinct? One may as well ask, where do you get the idea that it is objectively valuable for all creatures to follow their biological intuition? If someone, say Hitler, fights that instinct, how can you oppose him for fighting a biological intuition? We might as well condemn him for choosing not to urinate when he feels inclined, or his biological instinct asks him to do so. Aren’t you imposing an objective value upon him by suggesting that everyone should adhere to your assumption that the biological intuition is worth following?
Second, please answer the following. Assuming you believe we have evolved:
How do we go from being an amoral, impersonal first cause, and through a non-moral process, become moral and personal and claim that there is no transcendent objective moral law?
Oh, and one more thing -
Even if you reduce your "moral intuition" in the same way you do your likes of certain colors and tastes,
May I disagree with an act of murder in the same way I disagree with someone's taste in chicken, or the color blue? If so, why make a distinction in our irreducible biological intutions?
Let's also consider 2 more questions:
1)Is the following accurate? If not, please explain. From you perspective, if you disagree with someone's actions, they are nothing more than a moron - for all that compels them is "reason." Hitler has acted "unreasonably," and is no more morally culpable than someone who crosses the road without looking in both directions.
2)Also, how can we reduce someone's desire to self-sacrifice for another person as something that is "within reason?" Isn't our biological instinct to primarily survive? If I'm in a burning forest and I can either save myself or the person in need, wouldn't my "reason" tell me to save myself?
[i]Christians believe in an absolute good. We know what is good, not because we read it in some text alone, rather it is because it is written on our hearts.[/i]
If this is the case then please explain how slavery can be condoned by God in the OT and Jesus in the NT.
As I mentioned in the following comment, the Bible is about human history that we have constantly suppressed the knowledge of the truth. God reveals His heart to us, yet we have the choice to deny it. Consider how most worldviews know how they "ought" to act but fail miserably in doing so.
Regarding God and Slavery, please read "The Way, The Truth, and the Slave-Driving Misogynist" and the posts that follow.
Jason,
If you didn't already know due to the writing style and verbiage used, I had help from a friend with the comments posted on this entry. I should have disclosed this with my first comments, and I have no excuse for my toying with you like that.
I feel bad and feel I have been morally wrong. These comments have come from Gregory at the forums at evilbible.com. I felt over matched by your knowledge and went for outside help. I am sure you must have had some inkling that something was much different about these comments.
I apologize for my wrongdoing. I will go back to my more basic questions because I feel they benefit others by bringing up the more common issues.
BTW: still waiting for your profile. :)
good stuff bigtex71 :)
I believe its best to keep these things simple in the first place
The Way, The Truth, and the Slave-Driving Misogynist
reading now I shall be :D
Erm.. I just read that post and it doesn't say anything??
:\
Hey Bigtex,
Although I had a feeling it wasn't your writing, there really is no need to apologize. However, I hope that I have illustrated how for a person who knows that his/her objection against Hitler's action is more than a feeling, that there is no logical way we can receive a moral law without a Moral-Law Giver, God. When you talk about wanting evidence to point to God's existence, look within yourself. Are your moral values, abhorring the rape of children, something that is the figment of your imagination? I don't think you would want to say that. However, there is no explanation outside the existence of God, that explains morality. 2 more things:
1) I will certainly provide more profile info.
2) The questions I asked in comment 8,9, and 10, in this post are unanswered.
I hope you're doing well.
I'm sorry Ghost,
I have elaborated in the posts written immediately after it. I broke it up for the sake of readability.
this is confusing :)
so in which post did you adress slavery condoned by god then please?
Hey Ghost,
I apologize. It appears that although my intention was readability, I have made this more difficult for everyone=).
Okay, start in the post that says,
"The Way, the Truth, and the Slave-Driving Misogynist?"
then read:
"Only Human," "The Who, What, When, Where, and Why" and "We're Finally Here."
Oops,
Before you read "We're Finally Here," read, "We must listen to every word."
Oops,
Before you read "We're Finally Here," read, "We must listen to every word."
lol
nice one
I am going to go and try to make sense of it all then m8 :D
okay I managed to get your point :D
Where in the bible does it say God abhores slavery please?
I saw your profile and I will admit that I am flabbergasted. I originally thought you were a 40-something or 50-something year old with a theology degree. I cannot say that I am disappointed, but just shocked that someone of your age would be so well spoken. Most of the people I have spoken with in your age range left me thinking the school system was lacking. You have brought me hope that the system does actually work for some. :)
For the sake of continuity I will continue with Gergory's response (your quotes will be italicized for easier viewing.
Actually it originates from the Euthyphro Dilemma. As you know, Socrates asked Euthyphro whether or not we do what is good because the gods say so, or do the gods say things are good because they are intrinsically good – which would imply that goodness is outside the gods. Therefore, I don’t think I made a mistake in suggesting that your statement about the Divine Command Theory resonates with ideas of the Euthyphro Dilemma.
You are mistaken twice (well, a third time later on, as I am an Atheist as opposed to an agnostic, but that matters little.) Firstly I am not solely arguing about DCT, rather that other ethical theories which have morality ontologically tied to god (like yours, perhaps) suffer from the same difficulties as DCT. The second bit is the arguments I am using are far closer to the mark of Hume, Moore and Ayer (thankfully not too much on the latter) than Plato.
God is good in the same way that Water is H2O. I can talk about good things without knowing that I am talking about the very make-up, nature, or characteristics of God. If I tell someone that he/she is kind, I’m not saying that they are God. However, kindness let’s me know something about the nature of God. Similarly, although Hydrogen and Oxygen can be discussed separately, I must understand that Hydrogen and Oxygen lets me know something about the quality and nature of Water. Although hydrogen and oxygen, just as kindness and love, can be discussed in different conversations, we are essentially talking about the make-up of something else. Therefore, saying that “God is good” is no more vacuous than saying “Water is H2O.” Just as Hydrogen and Oxygen lets me know something about the nature of water, Kindness and Love gives me insight on the very nature of God. This is where I must make a clarification – I have insight on the nature of God because He has revealed Himself, the exemplification and personification of goodness, upon our hearts.
Once more, your linguistic legedemain shows nothing. The ontological claim still stands, no matter how indirectly you couch it. Moral facts are ontologically dependant upon god, even if they are done indirectly through virtues. Besides this, you're analogy is flawed for two reasons. Firstly is that the determination of water being H2O is emprical - there isn't an analytic concept of water from which H2O can be derived. In other words, you can't show from god there is morality, or vice versa. As your claim of value being tied somehow to god is not subject to any empirical observation you have stated, they are not the same. It is also circular and tautologous - God is good because virtues are part of his nature, which are good, and thus good is good. So, I again state my dilemma - if moral facts are dependant upon God, then you are in the realms of various arguments against ethical naturalism in general, and linguistic statements about good in particular, and, if moral facts are not dependant upon God, then you are once again in effectively Atheist territory. Which is it to be?
If you reduce your moral values to some biological intuition, how is someone wrong on a moral level to fight that biological instinct/intuition? Aren’t you presupposing that there it is objectively valuable to follow that instinct? One may as well ask, where do you get the idea that it is objectively valuable for all creatures to follow their biological intuition? If someone, say Hitler, fights that instinct, how can you oppose him for fighting a biological intuition? We might as well condemn him for choosing not to urinate when he feels inclined, or his biological instinct asks him to do so. Aren’t you imposing an objective value upon him by suggesting that everyone should adhere to your assumption that the biological intuition is worth following?
I have mentioned, repeatedly, and at length, that I'm a moral anti-realist (well, strictly moral skeptic, but thats trivial) and thus don't assert 'objective values' haven't I?
Once again you misunderstand Moore badly (at least, I hope you are, instead of making a ludicrous straw man of seldom followed evolutionary ethics to bash evolution with), which I would be more inclined to forgive if you weren't arguing a field that was meta ethics. Moore doesn't say it is a biological intuitition to do the right thing, more that we have a 'biological' sense of it - again, like colour. Say like black and white, light and dark, whatever. It is just there. Thus, if we pick someone which is wrong (darker, if you will), that is doing a bad thing - we might have good cause to be genuinely mistaken, etc. but it is still bad. The problem isn't that, it is that if we are epistemically ignorant of moral facts courtesy of being Atheists, we can't be held to be morally accountable - or, in a soundbyte, we aren't bad people, even if we do bad things. You are arguing evolutionary ethics, and I am using Moore - ethical naturalism has been basically slain where it stands since his work (and, to forestall you, his arguments work just as effectively against ethical supernaturalism, which you are after a fashion claiming) and its recent proponents do not argue anything remotely similar to Christian ethics.
Of course, you can argue that we can treat morality as an objective quantity providing the ideas of those conversing correspond well - morality being agreement instead of fact, in which case, you are indeed right in thinking there is no more to it then that - again, I don't assert there needs to be whatsoever. Once again, the only thing that sets Christian ethics apart is often garbled ideas of ethical naturalism, I don't know how many different ways I can describe this, but you have yet to show how the addition of God acts as a get out clause from any of a multitude of arguments (is-ought gap, naturalistic fallacy, ideas of ethical language, etc. etc.)
Which brings me to what you said earlier - 'transcendental' ethics don't work well because they are executed by the same ethical arguments as non-transcendental ones are - once again, whilst it could be true that ethical facts are indeed what God says, or according to gods will, or whatever, they need to be SHOWN. Transcendental ideas do not give you any epistemic high ground (and arguably descend into meaninglessness and vacuousness all too easy) and, by far the most important. I'm your interluctor, I don't need to have a metaethical position, still less a coherant one, to show your argument to be unsound - in the same way, Atheists don't need to believe in Good to use a problem of evil - it is showing the Christian worldview to be internally inconsistent.
How do we go from being an amoral, impersonal first cause, and through a non-moral process, become moral and personal and claim that there is no transcendent objective moral law?
The first is a matter of cosmology, the second is a matter of science, and our moral code is a matter of evolutionary psychology and a bit of romanticism on our part claiming it to be somehow 'above' baser concerns. The very fact how little is said by theoretical discussions of ethics should be proof positive that ethical realism is a very precarious house of cards indeed - and God doesn't shore up your foundations any.
May I disagree with an act of murder in the same way I disagree with someone's taste in chicken, or the color blue? If so, why make a distinction in our irreducible biological intutions?
You misunderstand, it isn't a matter of agreement, to Moore, it is a matter of fact. You can disagree with something being blue, but the fact of the matter is it is blue. Whilst a few of us might be unable to have the 'correct' sense of blue (colour blindness, say), for the vast majority of us, we know what blue is, and, according to Moore, the same applies to good - it doesn't matter that there is disagreement over the matter. The distinction is obvious, you're two examples are amoral, whereas the 'moral sense' we all are meant to have is, by definition, moral (incompetant, erroneous and inaccurate it might be.)
Is the following accurate? If not, please explain. From you perspective, if you disagree with someone's actions, they are nothing more than a moron - for all that compels them is "reason." Hitler has acted "unreasonably," and is no more morally culpable than someone who crosses the road without looking in both directions.
No (note the part about me being a moral anti realist - I am quite happy to say Hitler is 'evil', but I certainly wouldn't consider it a declaration of fact.) A typical moral realist response in support of morality being based pretty much on reason (which, in most of western philosophy, fits) would be that Hitler willfully chose a course of action which there were vast, powerful reasons against, and thus did a very great evil, wheras not looking either way is foolish, and immoral, but not remotely on the same scale.
2)Also, how can we reduce someone's desire to self-sacrifice for another person as something that is "within reason?" Isn't our biological instinct to primarily survive? If I'm in a burning forest and I can either save myself or the person in need, wouldn't my "reason" tell me to save myself?"
A common misunderstanding. Firstly, once again, if you are asserting moral facts (you are, I'm not, other Atheists are, and I'm showing that you and the other Atheists are in the same moral camp instead of you having one up on them.) Thus it is entirely reasonable for us to abide by these ethical facts even if tehy don't follow self interest (indeed, only ethical egoism would assert anything else, and noone really argues that.) There is more for ideas like sacrificing the self for the group carrying evolutionary advantage, but I confess to lacking the energy.
Regards.
P.S. Of course, all of this is entirely irrelevant, even if transcendental roots to morality are the only viable strategy for an objective moral law (which I hope I have managed to veritably put to the sword) it doesn't mean the Christians transcendental good is the correct one. But nevermind.
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